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undreds of thousands of Americans each year sign pieces of 
paper “voluntarily” admitting themselves into psychiatric 
hospitals.1  Many, perhaps most, do not understand the legal 
significance of the piece of paper, which drastically curtails individual 
freedom.  In some states, signing the paper means that the patient can 
be held against his will for up to five days before the facility has to 
release him or attempt to justify continued detention.2 
Although the effect on personal liberty is generally not as severe, 
much the same thing routinely happens with respect to other health 
care decisions.  Doctors often treat patients who have dubious 
capacity and do not object to treatment without assessing capacity or 
 
1 Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization: A Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence Analysis of Zinermon v. Burch, 14 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 169, 179 
(1991) [hereinafter Winick, Competency to Consent]. 
2 See infra note 92 and accompanying text. 
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considering alternative decision making.3 Lack of capacity promises 
to be a growing issue as the population ages because the risk of 
dementia increases exponentially with age.4 
Capacity is critical because the doctrine of informed consent 
requires that the patient have capacity to consent.5  But this 
requirement is overwhelmed by forces pulling in the opposite 
direction.  First, law presumes capacity.6  Second, the primary ethical 
goal of beneficence, improving patient well-being, guides medical 
practice.  If the patient agrees to do what the doctor believes is in the 
patient’s best interests, the doctor looks no further and simply 
presumes capacity. 
The practice of treating without meaningful consent violates the 
fundamental principle of patient autonomy or self-determination.  
Assent without capacity is not an expression of autonomy; it is at best 
an illusion of autonomy.  The practical problem with accepting 
incompetent consent is that it systematically leads to treatment where 
patients, if they had capacity, would refuse it.  Self-determination is 
and should be the dominant objective in medical decision making and 
it should be implemented by minimizing instances in which treatment 
deviates from what the patient, if competent, would want. 
Some commentators believe that incompetent consent is not a 
problem.  “If a patient consents to treatment, his or her competency is 
not important if a finding of incompetency would likely lead to 
treatment.”7  The words “likely,” “if,” and “consents” should ring 
alarms.  As for “likely,” the issue of competency is important if 
treatment sometimes, even if less than half the time, would be refused 
by an alternative decision-making scheme.  The second “if” raises the 
question of who decides whether treatment is likely given an 
incompetency finding.  Accepting incompetent-patient assent at face 
value cedes control over the treatment decision to the doctor.  
Evidence shows that doctors are worse than relatives at predicting a 
patient’s treatment preferences.  The better and more direct way to 
find out whether an alternative decision maker would consent to 
 
3 On alternative decision making, see, e.g., infra notes 27–31 and accompanying text. 
4 J.G. Wong et al., Capacity to Make Health Care Decisions: Its Importance in Clinical 
Practice, 29 PSYCHOL. MED. 437, 438 (1999). 
5 Wendy M. Margolis, Comment, The Doctor Knows Best?: Patient Capacity for 
Health Care Decisionmaking, 71 OR. L. REV. 909, 918–19 (1992). 
6 See infra notes 20, 23 and accompanying text. 
7 Elyn R. Saks & Dilip V. Jeste, Capacity to Consent to or Refuse Treatment and/or 
Research: Theoretical Considerations, 24 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 411, 423 (2006). 
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treatment is to test the patient’s capacity, then simply ask the 
alternative decision maker if appropriate.  Finally, and most 
fundamentally, a patient cannot “consent” without capacity, and 
treatment without capable consent is medical battery.8 
This Article will examine three hypothetical situations involving 
health care decision making.  The issue in each will be how to make a 
medical decision when the patient does not refuse treatment but may 
lack decision-making capacity.  The Article will first discuss how 
treatment decisions are actually being made, then examine how these 
decisions are supposed to be made under current law.  For 
concreteness, the focus will be on Illinois law, but the implications 
will be general.  Next, the Article will propose and defend a new 
model of decision making.  The guiding principle is that treatment 
decisions should correspond as closely as possible to patients’ true 
preferences. 
The specific issues addressed will be: when to test capacity, how to 
test capacity, and what to do when capacity is lacking.  To preview 
the conclusions: (1) existing data and new theories are marshaled in 
support of mandatory capacity assessment in various circumstances; 
(2) standardized instruments rather than physician discretion should 
be used to assess capacity; and (3) when capacity is lacking, the 
patient does not resist treatment, and there is no advance directive, a 
familial surrogate should make the medical decision because family 
predicts patient preferences better than doctors. 
The final Part before the Conclusion will consider possible 
extensions of the model to instances in which no surrogate is 
available or the patient refuses treatment. 
 
8 Franklin v. United States, 992 F.2d 1492, 1497 (10th Cir. 1993).  It is therefore 
misleading to speak about competency to refuse treatment.  See Saks & Jeste, supra note 
7, at 423.  It is treatment, not the lack of treatment, that must be justified. 
 As the reader will have noticed, “competence” is sometimes used in this Article instead 
of “capacity.”  The terms are equivalent for purposes of this Article.  Both mean the ability 
to give informed consent to medical treatment.  This Article will generally use capacity 
rather than competence for several reasons: “incapacitated” is less stigmatizing than 
“incompetent,” capacity is more likely to be properly construed as task-specific, and 
capacity has more clinical connotations, which are this Article’s focus. 
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Hypotheticals: 
(1) The doctor of an elderly married woman with delirium 
 concludes that the patient would benefit from a nonemergent blood 
transfusion.  The patient assents9 to the transfusion. 
(2) A widow with dementia is having evening delusions.  Her 
 clinic doctor would like to prescribe an antipsychotic  medication.  
The patient assents to treatment. 
(3) An unmarried man with bipolar disorder presents to a mental 
health care facility experiencing manic symptoms.  The patient is 
willing to sign a voluntary-admission form. 
I 
CURRENT PRACTICE 
In all three hypotheticals, it is quite likely that each patient would 
receive treatment with no further examination of patient capacity and 
no exploration of alternative decision making.  “Questions concerning 
patient competence tend to be raised only when patients decline to 
follow physicians’ recommendations . . . .”10  In one retrospective 
study of informed consent practices, “nearly all” patients sampled in a 
hospital setting studied had “questionable decision-making capacity,” 
but “only patients who refused treatment had their competence 
challenged.”11  In one epidemiologic study of older inpatients who 
developed delirium, researchers found no documented assessments of 
decision-making capacity.12  This despite a “relatively high baseline 
rate of functional impairment (76%) . . . and notable cognitive 
impairment (mean MMSE of 20.1).”13 
 
9 The word “assent” rather than “consent” is used throughout the hypotheticals because 
the patient may lack capacity to give informed consent. 
10 Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. 
III: Abilities of Patients to Consent to Psychiatric and Medical Treatments, 19 LAW. & 
HUM. BEHAV. 149, 171 (1995). 
11 Bennett S. Gurian et al., Informed Consent for Neuroleptics with Elderly Patients in 
Two Settings, 38 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 37, 42 (1990); see also Michael G. 
Farnsworth, Competency Evaluations in a General Hospital, 31 PSYCHOSOMATICS 60, 61 
(1990) (“[P]atients who refused medical treatment were more commonly referred for 
evaluation of competence than were patients who accepted treatment.”). 
12 Katherine B. Auerswald et al., The Informed Consent Process in Older Patients Who 
Developed Delirium: A Clinical Epidemiologic Study, 103 AM. J. MED. 410, 410 (1997). 
13 Id. at 413.  “MMSE” stands for mini-mental state examination, which is a thirty-point 
cognitive function screening tool.  A score of twenty is at the low end of the mild-
dementia range.  Wikipedia, Mini-Mental State Examination,  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mini-mental_state_examination (last visited Dec. 20, 2008). 
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In another study surveying specialists, 89% of respondent 
psychiatrists, geriatric psychologists, and geriatricians reported that 
the following misconception regarding capacity determinations was 
either “common” or “very common” among referring clinicians: “[a]s 
long as a patient agrees with the practitioner’s health care 
recommendations, the practitioner fails to consider that the patient 
may lack capacity for decisions.”14  Among sixteen capacity pitfalls 
thought by respondents to be most important to address through 
education, this was the one that the highest percentage of respondents 
(52%) believed was “very common.”15 
Treatment without a capacity evaluation is most likely in 
Hypothetical Three, even though that is where the likelihood of 
incapacity and burdens of treatment are arguably greatest.  As another 
commentator notes, “[b]ecause most mental health professionals favor 
voluntary admission, ‘in practice the question of competence is 
usually ignored.’”16  As will be demonstrated below, the law in 
Illinois and other states exacerbates this practice.17 
II 
CURRENT LAW 
A.  Hypothetical One: Delirious Patient and Blood Transfusion 
Administering medical treatment without informed consent from a 
patient with capacity (absent an emergency,18 which this Article 
assumes) is medical battery.19  Thus, the doctor should first determine 
whether the patient has the capacity to give informed consent.  
Because the common law presumes that all adults have capacity,20 
 
14 Linda Ganzini et al., Pitfalls in Assessment of Decision-Making Capacity, 44 
PSYCHOSOMATICS 237, 239–40 tbl.1 (2003). 
15 Id. 
16 Karna Halverson, Voluntary Admission and Treatment of Incompetent Persons with a 
Mental Illness, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 161, 168 (2005) (quoting THOMAS G. GUTHEIL 
& PAUL S. APPELBAUM, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 48 (3d ed. 
2000)). 
17 Federal law, discussed below, discourages the practice, Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 
113 (1990), but it is widely ignored, e.g., Wilson v. Formigoni, 42 F.3d 1060, 1062–63 
(7th Cir. 1994). 
18 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-111 (2008) (allowing “essential medical . . . procedures” to 
be performed without consent when a “medical or dental emergency exists”). 
19 See supra note 8. 
20 E.g., Rodriguez v. Pino, 634 So. 2d 681, 685 (Fla. App. 1994), and authorities cited 
therein; see also Lotman v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 478 F.2d 868, 873 (3d Cir. 1973) 
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however, this may be an ethical rather than legal obligation.21  Under 
the Illinois Health Care Surrogate Act (the “Act”), “‘[d]ecisional 
capacity’ means the ability to understand and appreciate the nature 
and consequences of a decision regarding medical treatment or 
forgoing life-sustaining treatment and the ability to reach and 
communicate an informed decision in the matter as determined by the 
attending physician.”22  Everyone is presumed to have capacity for 
purposes of the Act “in the absence of actual notice to the contrary.”23  
Thus, that the doctor reasonably should know a patient lacks capacity 
does not override the presumption.24  The attending physician must 
find incapacity “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.”25  In the 
hypothetical, this means that the doctor will accept the patient’s 
assent to the transfusion unless the doctor is reasonably certain that 
the patient lacks capacity.  A finding of incapacity must be recorded 
in the patient’s medical record.26 
 
(presumption of sanity); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 cmt. d (1965) (burden 
on plaintiff to show absence of consent).  But cf. Estate of Allen v. Rockford Health Sys., 
Inc., 848 N.E.2d 202, 214 (Ill. 2006) (stating in dicta that presumption of capacity arising 
from statute does not apply to a common law claim for medical battery). 
21 AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS Op. 8.08, 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/Code_of_Med_Eth/opinion/ 
opinion808.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2009). 
22 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/10 (2008).  This standard is generally consistent with the 
Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act and the leading summary of legal competence in the 
medical literature.  See UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 1(3) (1994) (“‘Capacity’ 
means an individual’s ability to understand the significant benefits, risks, and alternatives 
to proposed health care and to make and communicate a health-care decision.”); Paul S. 
Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Assessing Patients’ Capacities to Consent to Treatment, 
319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1635, 1635–36 (1988) (listing abilities to communicate choices, 
understand relevant information, appreciate the situation and consequences, and 
manipulate information rationally).  The distinction between understanding and 
appreciation is not self-evident.  Appreciation can be thought of as applied understanding: 
acknowledging the personal impact of relevant information.  See id. at 1636. 
23 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/20(c) (2008). 
24 Ficke v. Evangelical Health Sys., 674 N.E.2d 888, 892 (Ill. 1996). 
25 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. 40/20(c) (2008).  One commentator has argued that a surrogate 
should be consulted whenever the patient “may lack capacity.”  Rebecca J. O’Neill, 
Surrogate Health Care Decisions for Adults in Illinois —Answers to the Legal Questions 
That Health Care Providers Face on a Daily Basis, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 411, 423 (1998).  
But, as the Act states, the doctor must be reasonably certain that the patient actually lacks 
capacity.  Otherwise, consulting a surrogate may violate patient privacy interests under the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.  45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a).  
The same commentator would limit surrogacy to “necessary” treatments, O’Neill, supra at 
423, but that limitation is ambiguous and unduly narrow. 
26 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/20(c) (2008). 
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If the doctor finds incapacity, she must next make reasonable 
inquiry into the existence of an applicable advance directive, like a 
living will or health-care power of attorney.27  In the absence of such 
a document, which this Article assumes,28 the doctor must next 
inquire as to the availability of individuals in the top four levels of a 
surrogate decision-maker hierarchy: (1) the patient’s guardian of the 
person, (2) the patient’s spouse, (3) any adult daughter or son of the 
patient, and (4) either parent of the patient.29 
Assume in the hypothetical that there is no court-appointed 
guardian and the patient’s husband is easily accessible.  If the patient 
lacks capacity, the doctor can generally rely on a treatment decision 
made by the husband unless that decision is “clearly contrary to [the] 
Act.”30  The Act instructs that 
[a] surrogate decision maker shall make decisions for the patient 
conforming as closely as possible to what the patient would have 
done or intended under the circumstances . . . .  If the adult patient’s 
wishes are unknown . . . , the decision shall be made on the basis of 
the patient’s best interests as determined by the surrogate decision 
maker.31 
This two-prong test — substituted judgment first, then best interests 
of the patient — corresponds to the two values at stake in medical 
decision making: self-determination, generally first, and the patient’s 
well-being, generally second.32  The doctor also cannot rely on the 
 
27 Id. § 40/25(a). 
28 This assumption is reasonable: “Population-based estimates of completed advance 
directives range from 5% to 15%.”  Sharda D. Ramsaroop et al., Completing an Advance 
Directive in the Primary Care Setting: What Do We Need for Success?, 55 J. AM. 
GERIATRICS SOC’Y 277, 277 (2007); see also Jeffrey Swanson et al., Psychiatric Advance 
Directives Among Public Mental Health Consumers in Five U.S. Cities: Prevalence, 
Demand, and Correlates, 34 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 43, 54 (2006) (4%–13% of 
mental-health consumers had completed psychiatric advance directives). 
29 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/25(a)(1)–(4) (2008).  The rules, including surrogate 
priority, are the same under section 5 of the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act. 
30 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/30(a) (2008).  At least one commentator has suggested that 
this transfer of decision-making authority to a surrogate violates due process.  O’Neill, 
supra note 25, at 428.  I am aware of no successful challenge to a surrogacy act on these 
grounds.  To the contrary, the Indiana Supreme Court squarely rejected such a challenge.  
See In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 42 n.8 (Ind. 1991) (surrogacy statute did not convert 
family decision into state action for due process purposes). 
31 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/20(b-5)(1) (2008).  This mandate is in accord with section 5 
of the Unified Health-Care Decisions Act. 
32 See, e.g., Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1236 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978); McFall v. 
Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1978); cf. Allen Buchanan & Dan W. Brock, 
Deciding for Others, 64 MILBANK Q. 17 (Supp. 2 1986). 
 2008] Illusory Consent 361 
surrogate if the patient “objects” to the surrogate or any decision 
made by the surrogate.33 
Suppose the husband’s lone objection is that his wife is afraid of 
needles.  The doctor should pause twice before accepting this decision 
because: (1) the doctor cannot rely on the husband’s decision if it is 
clear that the patient would set aside her fear of needles, i.e., the 
decision would be “clearly contrary” to the Act’s substituted-
judgment rule; and, more fundamentally, (2) the patient’s assent 
arguably constitutes an objection to her husband’s decision, which 
would negate operation of the Act.  Either way, the doctor is left with 
no one having authority to consent to treatment and, without a trip to 
court, can transfuse only at peril of an action for medical battery.  It is 
important to emphasize that the second reason for pause — the 
patient’s objection — applies no matter how good the justification for 
the surrogate’s decision.  Suppose instead of a needle phobia, the 
husband had said that his wife was a devout Jehovah’s Witness and 
could therefore not accept a blood transfusion.  Even though the 
patient assented while in an incapacitated state, her assent would 
counteract her husband’s conscious decision. 
Of course, if the husband consents to the blood transfusion, then 
the doctor is on sturdier footing.  Unless the doctor knows the patient 
would refuse the transfusion, such that treatment would be clearly 
contrary to the statutory substituted-judgment rule of decision 
making, or the doctor has other reason to think the husband is 
thwarting the Act, she can safely rely on the husband’s consent. 
B.  Hypothetical Two: Delusional Patient and Antipsychotic 
Medication 
As above, the doctor should assess capacity to satisfy her ethical 
duty with respect to informed consent and to avoid a claim of medical 
battery.  In this second scenario, however, a third source of this duty 
arises.  The Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (the 
“Code”) mandates disclosure of risks and benefits of psychotropic 
medication or electro-convulsive therapy (“ECT”) and compels the 
doctor to “determine and state in writing whether the recipient has the 
 
33 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/20(c) (2008).  This provision is consistent with the law in 
other states.  See CAL. PROB. CODE § 4689 (West 2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 201D, § 6 
(2008); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2983(5) (McKinney 2008). 
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capacity to make a reasoned decision about the treatment.”34  
Although this language appears in section 5/2-102, a section of the 
Code that also discusses duties of “the facility,” that section is not 
limited to the inpatient setting.  The following two sections expressly 
limit their scope to recipients “who reside[] in a mental health . . . 
facility,”35 while section 5/2-102 includes no such limitation and thus 
applies to both inpatient and outpatient settings.36 
If the doctor finds capacity, the doctor will again accept the 
patient’s consent and order treatment.  If the doctor finds a lack of 
capacity, her road diverges sharply from the blood-transfusion case.  
A surrogate decision maker other than a court-appointed guardian 
may not consent to the administration of psychotropic medication or 
ECT.37  Assume that the patient’s only adult child is available and 
consents to administration of psychotropic medication.  That consent 
is meaningless under the clear terms of the Act and Code.  The 
nonguardian surrogate’s power to refuse treatment, no matter how 
good the reason (e.g., a severe adverse reaction in the past to the 
particular medication proposed), is also questionable.  The Code’s 
most specific statutory provision on this point limits the right to 
refuse medication to “[t]he recipient and the recipient’s guardian or 
substitute decision maker.”38  “Substitute decision maker” is defined 
to include only individuals appointed in advance directives, not by 
operation of the Act.39 
The doctor needs authority from somewhere other than the patient 
or patient’s surrogate.  There are two options: guardianship or a 
mental-health treatment petition under the Code.  Guardianship is 
 
34 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-102(a-5) (2008).  I am aware of no comparable provision 
in California, Massachusetts, or New York. 
35 Id. §§ 5/2-103, 5/2-104. 
36 To the contrary, section 5/2-102 uses the unmodified word “recipient,” which is 
defined to include, inter alia, any person who has received or is receiving “treatment.”  Id. 
§ 5/1-123.  “Treatment,” in turn, expressly covers “outpatient services.”  Id. § 5/1-128. 
37 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/60(a)–(b) (2008); 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-121.5 (2008).  
At least nine other states and the District of Columbia exclude some forms of mental-
health care from their surrogate decision-making statutes.  ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.030(a) 
(West 2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3231(E) (West 2007); CAL. WELF. & INST. 
CODE § 5325 (West 2008); D.C. CODE § 21-2211 (West 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
765.113(1) (West 2007); MD. HEALTH–GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-605(d)(2) (West 2008); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-227(5) (West 2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-13 (West 
2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-12-13(4) (West 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986(C) 
(West 2008). 
38 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-107(a) (2008). 
39 Id. § 5/1-110.5. 
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rarely used in the mental-health context, both because a guardian has 
no authority to override a patient’s treatment refusal40 and because it 
is a time-consuming and relatively permanent process.  Delay is 
critical since mental-health treatment can often restore capacity.  Any 
person over eighteen years of age can file a mental-health treatment 
petition.41  Subject to certain continuances, the court must hold a 
hearing within seven days of the filing of the petition.42  To authorize 
treatment, the court must find seven factors by clear and convincing 
evidence, including that the recipient lacks capacity and that the 
benefits of treatment outweigh the harm.43 
C.  Hypothetical Three: Manic Patient and Hospitalization 
Again, the doctor should first assess capacity.  There is no specific 
statutory requirement to do so,44 unlike with psychotropic medication 
and ECT.  There is, however, United States Supreme Court case law 
strongly suggesting that due process requires some assessment of 
capacity at least in state-run facilities.  In Zinermon v. Burch, a patient 
complained that he lacked capacity to give informed consent, and thus 
his voluntary admission to a psychiatric facility deprived him of 
liberty without due process of law.45  The Court decided the case on a 
technical ground, expressly indicating that it was not deciding what 
the Constitution required in such cases.46  The Court did, however, 
state that the patient’s five-month confinement, with no hearing or 
other procedure to determine the validity of consent or whether the 
patient met the standard for involuntary placement, “clearly infringes 
on [the] liberty interest” in avoiding confinement in a mental 
hospital.47 
If the doctor finds capacity, the patient can consent to voluntary 
admission.  If the doctor finds incapacity, reliance on surrogate 
consent is expressly prohibited.48  A surrogate may, however, petition 
 
40 Id. § 5/2-107.1(b). 
41 Id. § 5/2-107.1(a-5)(1). 
42 Id. § 5/2-107.1(a-5)(2). 
43 Id. § 5/2-107.1(a-5)(4). 
44 In this respect, Illinois is like most states.  See Winick, Competency to Consent, supra 
note 1, at 178 n.59. 
45 494 U.S. 113, 114–15 (1990). 
46 Id. at 117. 
47 Id. at 131. 
48 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-601.2 (2008).  In this, Illinois is like many other states.  
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.113(1) (West 2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-227(5) 
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for involuntary admission.49  But the grounds for voluntary and 
involuntary admission are different.  Involuntary admission requires 
that the patient be “in such a condition that immediate hospitalization 
is necessary for the protection of such person or others from physical 
harm.”50  In contrast, voluntary admission is allowed on the broader 
and more discretionary ground that “the facility director deems [the 
patient] clinically suitable for admission as a voluntary recipient.”51  
Some incapacitated patients who could benefit from hospitalization 
(and would consent to it if competent) may not be immediately 
dangerous and therefore could not be admitted either voluntarily or 
involuntarily.  Plainly, there is potential for some individuals to fall 
between the cracks.52 
If the incapacitated bipolar man in the hypothetical is dangerous to 
himself or others, any person eighteen years or older, including the 
facility director, may file a petition for involuntary admission.53  The 
petition generally must be accompanied by a certificate executed by a 
mental-health professional relaying clinical observations based on an 
examination made not more than seventy-two hours prior to 
admission.54  Within twenty-four hours of admission, the facility 
director must file the petition and certificate in court, and a hearing 
must be scheduled within five days.55  If the incapacitated man 
presents no immediate danger to himself or others, he cannot be 
admitted, despite his willingness to sign a consent form, his 
surrogate’s concurrence, and his need for admission on any ground 
other than dangerousness. 
 
(2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-13(E) (West 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-12-13(4) 
(2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986(C) (2001). 
49 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-601.2 (2008). 
50 Id. § 5/3-601(a). 
51 Id. § 5/3-400. 
52 See Francine Cournos et al., Report of the Task Force on Consent to Voluntary 
Hospitalization, 21 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 293, 293 (1993) (“[N]ot every 
patient who could benefit significantly from voluntary hospitalization will meet the more 
restrictive requirements for involuntary hospitalization . . . .”).  This gap exists in many 
states other than Illinois. 
53 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-601(a). 
54 Id. § 5/3-602. 
55 Id. § 5/3-611. 
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D.  Sources of the Disconnect Between Law and Practice 
Doctors fail to test the capacity of assenting patients for several 
reasons.  Probably the strongest force at work is doctors’ overriding 
goal of beneficence.56  The doctor has already determined that 
treatment is in the patient’s best interests.  If the patient does not 
resist, the overwhelming pull is toward treatment.  The “asymmetric 
sliding scale,” discussed infra Part III.B.1, also tilts against testing, 
because it sets the capacity bar low where the patient makes the 
“right” decision. 
The next contributing cause is the presumption of capacity.  Few 
doctors may be aware that a legal presumption of capacity exists, but 
they no doubt operate consistent with the presumption, and their 
lawyers would require capacity forms along with informed consent 
forms if the presumption did not exist.  A related factor is the absence 
of any enforced legal requirement to test capacity.  To be sure, Illinois 
technically requires capacity testing before administration of 
psychotropic medications or ECT, but there is no enforcement 
provision or penalty.57  With voluntary hospitalization, apart from 
Zinermon’s dicta, there is no requirement even on paper.  A final 
cause of the failure to test capacity is the high cost of an incapacity 
finding.  This applies most strongly in the mental-health context, 
where a lack of capacity always requires a trip to court, but it also 
applies whenever patient and surrogate disagree in non-mental-health 
settings.58 
III 
NEW MODEL 
This Part outlines and defends an alternative model of health care 
decision making for the situation in which a patient with dubious 
capacity assents to treatment.  Specifically, the model addresses when 
to test capacity, how to test capacity, and what to do when capacity is 
lacking.  Because the first question (when to test) turns on the 
 
56 See Buchanan & Brock, supra note 32, at 28. 
57 On the other hand, tort liability is possible.  See Threlkeld v. White Castle Sys., 205 
F. Supp. 2d 935, 937 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
58 Prohibiting surrogate decision making appears to cause assessors to lower the 
capacity threshold where testing is required.  Scott Y.H. Kim et al., Proxy and Surrogate 
Consent in Geriatric Neuropsychiatric Research: Update and Recommendations, 161 AM. 
J. PSYCHIATRY 797, 803 (2004).  Where testing is optional, it seems likely to suppose that 
physicians would test capacity less if surrogate decision making were unavailable. 
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accuracy of the test (how to test) and the accuracy of alternative 
decision making (what to do if incapacity is found), the three issues 
are discussed in reverse order. 
A.  What to Do When the Patient Lacks Capacity 
When a patient lacks capacity, someone else must make the 
decision for him.59  The candidates are: (1) the doctor, (2) the 
statutory surrogate, (3) an appointed proxy, (4) a guardian, or (5) a 
court.  To best promote self-determination, a proxy designated in an 
advance directive or health-care power of attorney should be given 
priority.60  If a guardian with power over the patient’s health care has 
already been appointed, the formal process through which such 
appointment occurred would seem to put the guardian next in line.  
Going to court in every case either to appoint a guardian or to decide 
a treatment question would squander precious treatment time and 
overburden the courts.61  Lack of a proxy or guardian leaves the 
doctor and statutory surrogate as the viable first-line decision makers.  
In current practice, especially in mental health, treatment decisions 
are often left entirely to the doctor’s discretion if the patient assents.  
Surrogates would make better decisions. 
A recent review of sixteen studies found that surrogates predicted 
patients’ treatment preferences with 68% accuracy.62  The reviewers 
concluded that the “data undermine the claim that reliance on 
surrogates is justified by their ability to predict incapacitated patients’ 
treatment preferences.”63  But surrogates did significantly better than 
chance: the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval (CI) on the 
 
59 This assumes reasonable efforts to improve capacity have failed.  Research has 
demonstrated the effectiveness of such efforts.  Scott Y.H. Kim et al., Current State of 
Research on Decision-Making Competence of Cognitively Impaired Elderly Persons, 10 
AM. J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 151, 162 (2002); David J. Moser et al., Using a Brief 
Intervention to Improve Decisional Capacity in Schizophrenia Research, 32 
SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 116, 116 (2005). 
60 This is already the rule in Illinois at least.  In re Schmidt, 699 N.E.2d 1123, 1130 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1998). 
61 1 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND 
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE 
ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-
PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP 55, 185 (1982) [hereinafter MAKING HEALTH CARE 
DECISIONS]. 
62 David I. Shalowitz et al., The Accuracy of Surrogate Decision Makers: A Systematic 
Review, 166 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 493, 496 (2006). 
63 Id. at 493, 496. 
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68% figure was 63% (the upper bound was 72%), well above the 50% 
one might expect from a coin toss.64  Furthermore, in scenarios more 
closely approximating an actual treatment decision, the 68% figure 
rose significantly: surrogates correctly predicted patients’ preferences 
in 79% of scenarios involving the patient’s current health (95% CI, 
74%–83%).65  On the other hand, surrogates were significantly less 
accurate in scenarios involving dementia (58%; 95% CI, 52%–64%), 
the one mental-health condition summarized in this review.66  Finally, 
and most important for present purposes, “[f]our additional studies 
confirmed that surrogates predict patients’ preferences more 
accurately than do physicians.”67 Those four studies covered fifteen 
hypothetical treatment scenarios; surrogates were more accurate than 
doctors in fourteen out of fifteen.68 
One of those four studies, like the second hypothetical in this 
Article, involved psychotropic medication.69  Patients’ closest 
relatives correctly predicted whether the patient would take a sleeping 
pill with 61% accuracy (n=36); physicians made the same decision as 
the patient in 43% of cases (n=53).70  Despite the small sample sizes, 
this difference approached marginal statistical significance (p=0.10).  
In sum, surrogates are better than chance and better than doctors at 
predicting patient preferences.71 
 
64 Id. at 495.  Confidence intervals are used to describe the reliability of an estimate.  A 
95% confidence interval means that we can be 95% certain that the actual surrogate 
accuracy level was between 63% and 72%.  The chance that surrogate accuracy was as 
low as 50% is vanishingly small. 
65 Id. 
66 Id.  One might wonder how we can know the preferences of demented patients.  The 
finding reported in Shalowitz’s text did not need to address that issue because, although 
the scenarios involved dementia, the patients surveyed were not actually demented. 
67 Id. at 496. 
68 Joseph G. Ouslander et al., Health Care Decisions Among Elderly Long-Term Care 
Residents and Their Potential Proxies, 149 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1367 (1989); 
Karem Principe-Rodriguez et al., Substituted Judgement: Should Life-Support Decisions 
Be Made by a Surrogate?, 18 PUERTO RICO HEALTH SCI. J. 405 (1999); Allison B. Seckler 
et al., Substituted Judgment: How Accurate Are Proxy Predictions?, 115 ANNALS OF 
INTERNAL MED. 92 (1991); Richard F. Uhlmann et al., Physicians’ and Spouses’ 
Predictions of Elderly Patients’ Resuscitation Preferences, 43 J. GERONTOLOGY M115 
(1988). 
69 Ouslander et al., supra note 68, at 1367. 
70 Id. at 1369 tbl.1, 1370 tbl.2. 
71 The review also provides some reason to think that statutorily designated surrogates 
may do as well as court-appointed guardians.  Patient-designated surrogates predicted 
patients’ preferences no better than legally assigned surrogates.  Shalowitz et al., supra 
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It would be a mistake, however, to put too much faith in the 
surrogate accuracy numbers found in the sixteen-study review for two 
reasons.  First, more than 90% of the 151 hypothetical scenarios 
involved interventions necessary to save or sustain the patient’s life.72  
Most health-care decisions are not potentially fatal, so research on 
more representative scenarios is needed.  Second, and related, it is 
likely that investigators in the underlying studies designed their 
hypotheticals to present difficult treatment decisions.  They would do 
so to avoid ceiling effects.  If 99% of patients would choose a 
particular treatment alternative, one would expect the surrogates to 
recognize this and to have a very low error rate.  One study supports 
this claim: 84% of patients chose vaccination in one of four clinical 
vignettes; surrogate accuracy was much higher in this vignette (78%) 
than in the other three (64% mean), which presented closer calls.73 
There are reasons to question whether a patient’s answer to a 
hypothetical question is an accurate gauge of the patient’s preference 
should the situation actually arise.  Preferences change over time.  In 
one study, about one-quarter of AIDS patients presented with 
hypotheticals regarding life-extending treatment changed their 
preferences after four months.74  A meta-analysis concluded that 
“over periods as short as two years, almost one-third of preferences 
for life-sustaining medical treatment changed.”75  To the extent 
patient preferences are a moving target, this presumably reduces 
surrogate accuracy below what a snapshot in time would suggest. 
It is important to note that there is a disconnect between the 
surrogate accuracy studies and what surrogates are actually asked to 
do.  Illinois is not alone in its two-tier standard for surrogate decision 
making: substituted judgment first and best interests second.76  There 
is no gold standard for best interests, so surrogate performance on this 
measure is impossible to test.  Instead, surrogates in accuracy studies 
are told to predict patient preferences even if that means guessing.  
 
note 62, at 496.  If the patient himself cannot select someone who will do better than the 
default statutory surrogate, then how can we expect a court to? 
72 Id. at 494. 
73 Ouslander et al., supra note 68, at 1369 tbl.1, 1370 tbl.2. 
74 Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective 
Forecasting, 80 IND. L.J. 155, 220 (2005) (citing Joel S. Weissman et al., The Stability of 
Preferences for Life-Sustaining Care Among Persons with AIDS in the Boston Health 
Study, 19 MED. DECISION MAKING 16, 20 (1999)). 
75 Angela Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider, Enough: The Failure of the Living Will, 
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.–Apr. 2004, at 30, 34. 
76 UNIFORM HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 2(e) (1994). 
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Presumably, surrogate accuracy in the studies would increase if the 
surrogates’ predictions were limited to instances in which they 
believed they knew how the patient would decide the question. 
That would, of course, leave decisions in which there is no 
indication as to what the patient would want, which would make 
substituted judgment impossible to apply.  Why prefer family 
members to make decisions here?  The best-interests standard in this 
context is subjective, not objective.  In weighing relevant benefits and 
burdens, surrogates in Illinois are instructed to “take into account any 
other information, including the views of family and friends, that the 
surrogate decision maker believes the patient would have considered 
if able to act for herself or himself.”77  Family members generally 
know the patient best; they are therefore best positioned to know what 
factors the patient would have considered, even if they do not know 
what decision the patient would have made.78 
Patients want their family members to make health-care decisions 
when there is no guidance on the patient’s treatment preference.  In 
one study of research choices among older individuals, “[a]lthough a 
clear majority (80.9%) preferred to give advance instructions rather 
than have their family members decide (12.6%), 87.8% also 
responded that their family members may consent for them if no 
advance directive exists.”79  A commentator summarized similar 
findings from other studies: “[A]n overwhelming majority 
(approximately ninety percent) of citizens . . . prefer that family 
 
77 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/20(b-5)(1) (2008). 
78 Jennifer L. Wright, Protecting Who from What, and Why, and How?: A Proposal for 
an Integrative Approach to Adult Protective Proceedings, 12 ELDER L.J. 53, 90–91 
(2004). 
 Closeness of relationship might be a better selection criterion than family ties, but 
closeness of relationship is hard to measure.  “[R]elational proximity is more difficult for 
physicians and judges to confirm than familial proximity, thus the latter is taken as a 
surrogate for the former.  As a matter of policy this still seems to be the most efficient 
course.”  Jonathan D. Moreno, Who’s to Choose? Surrogate Decisionmaking in New York 
State, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 5, 7. 
79 Kim et al., supra note 58, at 801.  There is some indication that psychiatric patients 
may have different preferences.  See Debra S. Srebnik et al., The Content and Clinical 
Utility of Psychiatric Advance Directives, 56 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 592, 596 (2005) 
(“Just under half of the sample (46 percent) [of individuals with severe and persistent 
mental illnesses in Washington state in 2001–2003] appointed a surrogate decision maker.  
Most often friends were listed, followed by parents, siblings, spouses, and children.”).  
Further research on surrogate preferences is needed. 
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members serve as health care proxies . . . .”80  There are other reasons 
to favor decision making by family members: “[F]amily members 
will be most affected by decisions, the patient excepted; . . . justice 
requires consideration of the effects on family; and . . . the family is a 
moral unit with responsibility for its members.”81 
Surrogate decision making may also lead to more accurate capacity 
testing.  In one large study, sites where surrogate decision making 
was prohibited reported much lower rates of incapacity than sites 
allowing surrogate decision making.82  Given that the study involved 
sufferers of Alzheimer’s disease with low MMSE scores, the very low 
levels of incapacity at the no-surrogacy sites are suspicious.83  This 
suggests that there is a powerful disincentive to finding incapacity if 
there is no surrogate decision-making structure in place. 
Introducing a surrogate may advance patient well-being as well as 
autonomy.  Research shows that patients without decision-making 
capacity are less likely to receive treatment consistent with the 
standard of care than patients with decision-making capacity.84  
Given how common it is to treat assenting incompetent patients 
without consulting surrogates, this finding suggests that the 
involvement of a second competent decision maker in addition to the 
doctor can improve the quality of medical care.  It is not surprising 
that collaborative decision making should achieve better outcomes. 
To be sure, there may be problems with relying on family 
members, especially because “[t]here is a high prevalence of elder 
abuse and exploitation by strangers, friends, and family members.”85  
In fact, “[d]isturbed patients not infrequently come from disturbed 
 
80 Alison Patrucco Barnes, The Randolph W. Thrower Symposium: Beyond 
Guardianship Reform: A Reevaluation of Autonomy and Beneficence for a System of 
Principled Decision-Making in Long Term Care, 41 EMORY L.J. 633, 686 (1992). 
81 Jeffrey T. Berger, Patients’ Interests in Their Family Members’ Well-Being: An 
Overlooked, Fundamental Consideration Within Substituted Judgments, 16 J. CLINICAL 
ETHICS 3, 4 (2005) (citing Dan W. Brock, What Is the Moral Authority of Family 
Members to Act As Surrogates for Incompetent Patients?, 74 MILBANK Q. 599, 599–618 
(1996)). 
82 Kim et al., supra note 58, at 803. 
83 See id. (MMSE scores ranged from thirteen to twenty-six, inclusive; incapacity levels 
ranged from 0% to 15%). 
84 Steven K. Hoge & Thomas C. Feucht-Haviar, Long-Term, Assenting Psychiatric 
Patients: Decisional Capacity and the Quality of Care, 23 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY 
& L. 343, 349 (1995). 
85 Jennifer Moye & Daniel C. Marson, Assessment of Decision-Making Capacity in 
Older Adults: An Emerging Area of Practice and Research, 62B J. GERONTOLOGY P3, P4 
(2007) (citation omitted). 
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families in which no available family member possesses sufficient 
capacity to grasp the complexities of major decisions.”86  Family 
dysfunction and conflicts of interest would seem especially likely 
among the mentally ill.  However, 
[w]hile it may be argued that permitting family members or close 
friends to make medical decisions on behalf of another without 
judicial approval has the potential for abuse, “the evidence for such 
abuse is all but nonexistent, and the health care system would slip 
into paralysis if it had to delay treatment of the large percentage of 
severely ill patients who are incompetent until a court hearing could 
be obtained.”87 
The statutory surrogate to a patient lacking capacity is first a 
patient-appointed proxy, then court-appointed guardian, followed by 
family members in descending closeness of relation,88 then close 
friends.  When the patient lacks capacity to give informed consent, 
the statutory surrogate should make medical-treatment decisions, 
including decisions regarding psychotropic medication and voluntary 
hospitalization.89  This would also include the power to overrule the 
incapacitated patient’s assent to treatment.90 
Because of the possibility of abuse, especially of mentally ill 
patients, three additional protections are needed.  First, a patient who 
continues to assent to treatment after being informed of his 
surrogate’s treatment refusal should have the right to insist on a 
second opinion regarding capacity.  That opinion should be rendered, 
where possible, by a health-care professional not involved in, or 
subordinate to anyone who is involved in, the patient’s treatment.  
Even with relatively low capacity-test accuracy, repeat testing can 
 
86 PAUL S. APPELBAUM & THOMAS G. GUTHEIL, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF 
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 205 (4th ed. 2007). 
87 Halverson, supra note 16, at 167 (quoting GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 16, at 
226).  On the other hand, evidence that there is not familial abuse is also lacking.  More 
research is needed. 
88 Although the exact priority list is outside the scope of this Article, a patient’s spouse 
would seem to belong on top of the familial hierarchy and should include a same-sex 
partner.  E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-5(B)(2) (West 2008). 
89 I am certainly not the first to make this proposal.  E.g., Halverson, supra note 16; 
Michael Irwin et al., Psychotic Patients’ Understanding of Informed Consent, 142 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 1351, 1354 (1985).  It is already the law in many states. 
90 This would require a change in Illinois law, see supra text accompanying and 
following note 33, as well as the laws of several other states.  E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 
4689 (West 2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 201D, § 6 (2008); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 
2983(5) (McKinney 2008). 
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substantially improve confidence in an incapacity finding.91  Second, 
if the doctor believes that the surrogate has clearly failed to respect 
the patient’s expressed wishes or, where the patient’s wishes are 
unknown, to advance the patient’s best interests, then the doctor ought 
to be able to petition the court for a treatment decision or appointment 
of a guardian. 
The third protection applies to voluntary admission for psychiatric 
care.  In Illinois, a patient who is voluntarily admitted must be 
discharged within five days of giving written notice of his desire to be 
discharged unless within that period an involuntary petition is filed.92  
The petition must be accompanied by two certificates from a 
physician, qualified examiner, or clinical psychologist stating that the 
patient is subject to involuntary admission and requires immediate 
hospitalization.93  Hearing on that petition must take place within five 
days of the filing of the petition.94  Thus, a voluntarily admitted 
patient can go ten days before getting a hearing on the 
appropriateness of hospitalization.  The two-certificate requirement 
renders the second five days somewhat less objectionable, but the 
initial five-day period is troubling. 
If a patient had capacity and understood the five-day holding 
period when he executed the voluntary admission form, then there 
would be less need to protect his change of mind.  Under my 
proposal, however, an incapacitated patient could be admitted on a 
“voluntary” basis through the consent of a surrogate.  Such a patient 
almost certainly had no understanding of the five-day period.  Should 
the patient regain capacity, five days is much too long to wait for 
release.  A patient admitted by a surrogate should have the right to a 
second opinion within twenty-four hours as to capacity and the 
appropriateness of hospitalization.  The second opinion should come 
from a health-care professional not involved in, or under the 
supervision of anyone who is involved in, the patient’s treatment.  If 
this professional finds capacity or release otherwise appropriate, the 
facility should be required immediately either to release the patient or 
to start involuntary admission proceedings. 
 
91 See infra note 187. 
92 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-403 (2008). 
93 Id.; id. § 5/3-602. 
94 Id. § 5/3-403. 
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B.  How to Assess Capacity 
Part III.A argued that familial surrogates should generally make 
treatment decisions for patients who lack capacity.  This subsection 
examines the question of how one ought to assess capacity.  The 
appropriateness of a moving threshold of capacity, or “sliding scale,” 
is discussed first, followed by an argument that capacity testing 
should be based on standardized instruments, not discretionary 
judgment. 
1.  Sliding Scale 
It is generally accepted that more exacting capacity scrutiny is 
merited for certain decisions.  There are at least three variations on 
this theme: (1) a higher threshold for capacity is needed when a 
patient refuses treatment than when a patient accepts treatment 
because treatment is the benefit-cost justified choice;95 (2) capacity 
testing is appropriate when a patient refuses treatment, but not 
necessary when the patient accepts treatment, because base rate 
incapacity is higher among treatment refusers;96 and (3) a higher 
threshold for capacity is called for when the treatment decision 
presented is complicated or high-stakes than when the decision is 
simple and low-stakes.97  Note that the first and second variations are 
asymmetric between refusal and acceptance, whereas the third version 
sets the capacity threshold based on the choice presented, not the 
decision made.  For reasons that will become clear, this Article will 
refer to these three variations, respectively, as the asymmetric sliding 
scale, the sliding screen, and the symmetric sliding scale. 
The rationale usually provided for the asymmetric sliding scale is it 
“takes into account the greater harm that may follow from the failure 
to accept necessary medical care.”98  But greater than what?  Greater 
 
95 Cathy A. Klein, Decision-Making Capacity and Informed Consent, 30 NURSE PRAC. 
12 (2005) (“A patient may have the capacity to consent to an intervention, but may lack 
the capacity to refuse it.”); APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 86, at 184.  If the cost-
benefit ratio is unfavorable, there is a high capacity threshold for acceptance and low 
threshold for refusal.  Loren H. Roth et al., Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 
134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279, 283 tbl.1 (1977). 
96 Klein, supra note 95, at 12 (“If a patient makes a decision that the [nurse practitioner] 
considers unreasonable, further investigation into the patient’s capacity is necessary.”). 
97 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 61, at 55, 60 (decision-making 
capacity does not depend “on the decision reached,” but greater capacity may be required 
where “the consequences for well-being are substantial”). 
98 Cournos et al., supra note 52, at 301. 
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than the harm that may follow from refusing optional rather than 
necessary medical care?  No; although this would justify the 
symmetric sliding scale, it does not justify the asymmetric version.  
The comparison must instead be between treatment and 
nontreatment— s pecifically, that is, treatment over objection versus 
respecting the objection.  If the patient has capacity, the harm of 
treatment over objection is an infringement on patient autonomy.  The 
harm of failing to treat an objecting patient is whatever health 
consequences follow.  Implicit in the asymmetric sliding scale is a 
judgment that patient well-being, as determined by the treating 
physician, sometimes outweighs patient autonomy. 
This same trade-off is at issue when the patient accepts treatment.  
The doctor can either accept assent at face value or examine the 
patient’s capacity, thereby risking treatment refusal by the surrogate 
(or court).  If treatment is strongly justified by cost-benefit analysis, 
the asymmetric sliding scale will put the capacity bar so low that 
detailed capacity-assessment is unnecessary.  The patient who 
expresses the “right” choice will almost always be deemed to have 
capacity.  Proposed guidelines for voluntary admission are 
illustrative.  After the Supreme Court’s decision in Zinermon, there 
was real concern that the practice of voluntary admission might be in 
trouble.  One response was to lower the capacity threshold for 
voluntary admission to require “communicating choices” and 
“understanding relevant information.”99  The relevant information 
included: (1) that the patient was being admitted to a psychiatric 
hospital for treatment, and (2) that release may not be automatic.100  
With this limited amount of information, almost no sane person 
would agree to admission.  The patient would insist at a minimum on 
knowing the terms and conditions governing release. 
As California has already done,101 all states should outlaw the 
asymmetric sliding scale.  Doctors should not have the right to trade 
off autonomy and well-being in setting the capacity threshold.  
Whether a patient has capacity should not depend on the choice made, 
but rather on the patient’s ability to make the choice.  Competent 
patients have an unqualified right to make decisions that their doctors 
 
99 Id. at 300. 
100 Id. at 304. 
101 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 813(b) (2002) (“A person who has the capacity to give 
informed consent to a proposed medical treatment also has the capacity to refuse consent 
to that treatment.”). 
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think unwise.102  The asymmetric sliding scale “conflates the 
determination of capacity and justified paternalistic interventions, or 
the determination of capacity and the normative evaluation of 
outcome.”103  A defense of the asymmetric sliding scale, which on its 
surface appears more compelling, is a desire to avoid erroneous 
failures to treat.104 But this defense ultimately depends on weighing 
failures to treat more heavily than failures to respect autonomy.105  If 
errors are particularly costly for certain treatment decisions, a 
symmetric solution is to test capacity more than once rather than 
placing a thumb on the scale to favor treatment.106 
More exacting capacity scrutiny along these lines is parallel to the 
second variation, the sliding screen.  Although screening for treatment 
refusers is generally justified as balancing autonomy and beneficence, 
the discussion below of whom to test for capacity demonstrates that a 
symmetric desire to minimize treatment errors can justify asymmetric 
screening if the data show a substantial difference in base rate 
incapacity between refusers and acceptors.107  More research is 
needed.  One must pay particular attention to the treatment decision at 
issue, since that will almost certainly have a large effect on observed 
incapacity levels. 
This leaves variation number three: the symmetric sliding scale.  
This version is appropriate.  Plainly, complex decisions require a 
greater level of understanding than simple ones, and weighty 
decisions demand more appreciation than trivial ones.108  Allowing 
the capacity standard to vary in these ways is just a corollary of the 
principle that capacity is task-specific.  Making decisions necessarily 
 
102 Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1236 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978). 
103 M. Parker, Competence by Consequence: Ambiguity and Incoherence in the Law, 25 
MED. L. 1, 8 (2006) (footnotes omitted).  For additional arguments against the sliding 
scale and a proposed three-tiered alternative, see Saks & Jeste, supra note 7, at 422–23. 
104 Alec Buchanan, Mental Capacity, Legal Competence and Consent to Treatment, 97 
J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 415, 417 (2004). 
105 See Parker, supra note 103, at 8 (“[I]f we raise the level of competence in order to 
avoid mistakes, we simultaneously increase the risk of overriding competent voluntary 
choices.”). 
106 See Gita S. Cale, Risk-Related Standards of Competence: Continuing the Debate 
Over Risk-Related Standards of Competence, 13 BIOETHICS 131, 148 (1999) (“While the 
risks related to a decision might be grounds for taking more care in assessing a person’s 
competence, they should not provide grounds for increasing the standards by which a 
person’s competence is assessed.”). 
107 See discussion infra Parts III.C.1, 6. 
108 On the distinction between understanding and appreciation, see Appelbaum & 
Grisso, supra note 22. 
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involves comparing alternatives.  Understanding and appreciating 
both alternatives is required for meaningful decision making.  The 
asymmetric sliding scale focuses on the perceived quality of one 
choice, the choice made, which improperly interjects physician value 
judgments.  In contrast, the symmetric sliding scale considers the 
complexity and stakes of the choices presented, not the choice made.  
The focus is properly on the decision-making process, not the result. 
2.  Standardized Instruments 
Capacity in close cases should be assessed through formal 
standardized instruments, not through doctors’ discretionary 
judgments.  The primary reason is simple: “informal assessments 
performed by physicians are idiosyncratic and unreliable.”109  One 
study reported a mere 56% agreement among unguided physician 
assessments of capacity in Alzheimer’s patients.110  A follow-up 
study by the same researchers employing specified legal standards 
and a standardized assessment tool found 76% agreement.111 
Even worse, unguided physician judgments appear to be 
systematically biased.  “[I]ncapacity may be more frequently 
diagnosed in treatment-refusers than in treatment-acceptors.”112  
Comparisons of instrument-based and clinician ratings of capacity 
find that a significant proportion of patients are judged by physicians 
to have capacity but by instruments to lack capacity.  “Notably, this 
rating discrepancy occurs most often with treatment-acceptors, 
implying a systematic rater bias with important ethical 
ramifications.”113  This pattern probably reflects use of the 
asymmetric sliding scale, which, as argued above, is inappropriate.  
 
109 Edward D. Sturman, The Capacity to Consent to Treatment and Research: A Review 
of Standardized Assessment Tools, 25 CLINICAL PSYCH. REV. 954, 954, 963 (2005). 
110 Daniel C. Marson et al., Consistency of Physician Judgments of Capacity to Consent 
in Mild Alzheimer’s Disease, 45 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 453, 453 (1997). 
111 Daniel C. Marson et al., Consistency of Physicians’ Legal Standard and Personal 
Judgments of Competency in Patients with Alzheimer’s Disease, 48 J. AM. GERIATRICS 
SOC’Y 911, 911 (2000).  Standardized instruments may not be needed in the ICU, where 
high levels of agreement in essentially unguided clinical judgments have been observed 
(89%).  Lewis M. Cohen et al., Do Clinical and Formal Assessments of the Capacity of 
Patients in the Intensive Care Unit to Make Decisions Agree?, 153 ARCHIVES OF 
INTERNAL MED. 2481, 2483 (1993). 
112 Jennifer Moye et al., Empirical Advances in the Assessment of the Capacity to 
Consent to Medical Treatment: Clinical Implications and Research Needs, 26 CLINICAL 
PSYCHOL. REV. 1054, 1064 (2006) (citation omitted). 
113 Id. at 1069. 
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The data suggest that instrument-based capacity assessment may help 
to overcome this bias.114 
The downside of standardized instruments is time.  The leading 
assessment tool, the MacCAT-T, requires substantial training and 
takes between fifteen and twenty minutes to administer.115  If, 
however, full-capacity testing were limited to instances in which 
screening in relatively high incapacity base-rate populations identifies 
problems, as proposed below, the costs would be largely be mitigated.  
Of course, training costs may still be substantial.  Preliminary success 
with one screening instrument led researchers to conclude that 
“screening every patient for clinical competency is possible and 
economically feasible.”116 
Several factors are relevant in reaching this conclusion.  The costs 
of administration and training are key, but those costs can be reduced 
not only by screening, but also by shifting responsibility for testing 
away from doctors toward less costly health-care professionals.  A 
standardized instrument includes many steps without discretionary 
judgment, where there is little need for a doctor.  Two primary 
benefits must be weighed against these costs: an increase in the true 
positive rate and a decrease in the false positive rate.  The inter-rater 
reliability numbers cited above are merely — but strongly—
suggestive of these benefits.  Given the very low inter-rater reliability 
of unguided discretionary judgment, it would appear that standardized 
instruments could generate substantial, cost-justified benefits. 
C.  When to Test for Capacity 
There are many possible answers to this question: never, always, 
before administering particular treatments, based on patient status 
(e.g., all inpatients), for certain diagnoses or symptoms, whenever the 
patient makes the “wrong” decision, and based on a screening test.  
Illinois law requires capacity testing for two treatments: psychotropic 
medication and ECT.  Does this requirement make sense?  Should 
capacity testing be required more narrowly or broadly?  And, if so, 
 
114 The leading standardized instruments measure abilities with respect to the particular 
treatment decision at issue, which effectively (and appropriately) incorporates the 
symmetric sliding scale. 
115 Thomas Grisso et al., The MacCAT-T: A Clinical Tool to Assess Patients’ 
Capacities to Make Treatment Decisions, 48 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1415, 1416 (1997). 
116 Jeffrey S. Janofsky et al., The Hopkins Competency Assessment Test: A Brief 
Method for Evaluating Patients’ Capacity to Give Informed Consent, 43 HOSP. & 
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 132, 135 (1992). 
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when?  Reviewing the other possibilities for capacity testing and 
existing data on incapacity will help to answer these questions. 
1.  General Propositions 
Never testing the capacity of patients to give informed consent 
would make the presumption of capacity irrebuttable.  This would be 
warranted if no one were in fact incapacitated, or if the test for 
incapacity had no validity, or if the alternative decision-making 
process were no better than letting an incapacitated patient decide.  
However, existing data strongly suggest that all three of these 
propositions are false.  Countless studies identify individuals who 
lack capacity.  Although the quest for validity is plagued by the 
absence of a readily available gold standard, high inter-rater reliability 
and comparison to expert judgment suggest that standardized 
capacity-assessment tools tend to meaningfully distinguish between 
those with and without capacity.  Further, surrogates do better than 
chance in predicting patient preferences. 
Testing every patient would obviously be very costly.  Again, the 
leading assessment tool requires training and takes between fifteen 
and twenty minutes to administer.117  Setting cost to one side, the 
base rate of incapacity among all patients is almost certainly too low 
to justify testing everyone.  Given reasonable assumptions about test 
validity and surrogate accuracy, it is possible to quantify this 
intuition. 
Assume, consistent with the overriding objective of self-
determination, that the goal of medical decision making is to 
minimize instances in which treatment deviates from a patient’s true 
preference.  Patients with capacity express their true preference one 
hundred percent of the time, whereas patients without capacity do no 
better than chance, stating their true preference 50% of the time.118  
(This assumes a binary choice, even though there may be more than 
one treatment option.)  A capacity test can only distinguish between 
 
117 Grisso et al., supra note 115, at 1416. 
118 Although capacity must necessarily be reduced to a yes or no outcome, it turns on 
continuous rather than dichotomous variables, so the assumptions of 100% and 50% are 
somewhat arbitrary.  The 100% figure can be defended as true by definition: if a patient 
has capacity, then the preference they express is deemed to be their actual preference.  The 
50% figure is more arbitrary.  It could be the case that some individuals without capacity 
make systematically bad (rather than random) choices.  It is also quite likely that some 
individuals just below the capacity threshold express their actual preferences more often 
than chance would determine.  I take 50% as an admittedly arbitrary central tendency. 
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the two categories of patients with error.  Assume that x represents the 
probability that the incapacity test correctly identifies incapacitated 
people as such.  Assume further that the false positive rate— t he 
probability of a positive incapacity test when the patient has 
capacity — is z.  If the patient tests positive for incapacity, the 
treatment decision will be made by a surrogate under a pure 
substituted judgment rule, with an accuracy rate of s.  Let y be the 
prevalence or base rate of incapacity in the patient population. 
The net effect of testing on treatment decisions is the number of 
treatment errors introduced due to false positives minus errors 
avoided due to true positives.  When those two numbers are equal, 
testing is equivalent to not testing in terms of treatment errors.  At a 
given level of surrogate accuracy, higher test accuracy and higher 
base rates will reduce treatment errors.  The following equation, an 
application of Bayes’ Theorem,119 shows the relationships among x, 
y, z, and s at the point of indifference between testing and not testing: 
 
EQUATION: THRESHOLD FOR CAPACITY TESTING 
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In words, the left side of the equation is the probability of a true 
positive multiplied by the improvement in decision making from 
substituting the surrogate for a patient without capacity.  The right 
side is the false positive rate times the effect of shifting from perfect 
decision making to a flawed surrogate.  When the effects of true 
positives and false positives are equal, testing and not testing produce 
equal numbers of treatment errors.  The equation is therefore a formal 
representation of that indifference point (curve, actually). 
Recall that surrogate accuracy in a recent review of sixteen studies 
was 68% overall, 79% for current health conditions, and 58% for 
scenarios involving dementia.120  Plugging these figures into the 
 
119 Bayes’ Theorem is a mathematical formula used to determine conditional 
probabilities.  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Bayes’ Theorem, http://plato 
.stanford.edu/entries/bayes-theorem (last visited Dec. 20, 2008). 
120 Shalowitz et al., supra note 62, at 493, 495. 
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equation as s, making an additional assumption about z,121 and 
graphing the relationship between x and y generates the following 
figure.122  Testing would reduce errors in the region above the line, 
but would increase errors below it. 
 
121 I assume that z is equal to 1 – x.  This is equivalent to assuming that sensitivity (1 – 
false negative rate) equals specificity (1 – false positive rate), which is not necessarily true.  
The effect of relaxing this assumption will be explored below, infra note 126. 
122 With known values for s and z reduced to a function of x, only x and y remain in the 
equation, so creating the graph is simply a matter of inserting values between 0 and 1 for x 
and solving for y, once for each value of s. 
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FIGURE: BASE RATE INCAPACITY JUSTIFYING CAPACITY TESTING 
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 The figure is useful in evaluating the proposition that every patient 
should be tested for capacity.  This Article’s author is not aware of 
any study measuring the validity of standardized capacity-assessment 
tools in predicting judicial or quasi-judicial determinations after 
hearings.  Whether or not such determinations are truly more accurate 
in gauging capacity, these rulings are given the force of law and thus 
become the “gold standard” by convention.  In the absence of such 
direct validity measures, one might suppose that reliability 
estimates—how often the judgments of two independent testers 
agree—are in the same ballpark as validity.  A very recent reliability 
estimate for judgments based on the MacCAT-T was approximately 
0.88.123  At this high level of test accuracy and the highest of the 
three surrogate-accuracy levels, the base rate of incapacity would 
need to be 9% or higher to justify across-the-board capacity testing.  
In fact, the levels of incapacity observed among control groups range 
 
123 Vanessa Raymont et al., The Inter-Rater Reliability of Mental Capacity Assessments, 
30 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 112, 114 (2007).  This paper reports kappa (k = 0.76), not 
percentage agreement.  I estimated percentage agreement using the formula for kappa.  See 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cohen%27s_kappa (last visited Feb. 10, 2009). 
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from 0% to 18%,124 and are generally less than 9%.  Thus, even if 
testing were costless and one makes assumptions that favor testing, it 
would probably not make sense to test every patient. 
Should we test subsets of patients selected by treatment, status, 
diagnosis, symptom, decision, or screening?  Given the same pro-
testing assumptions, the answer is yes whenever the base rate of 
incapacity is 9% or greater.  However, a great deal turns on the 
assumptions.  Suppose capacity-test accuracy were 0.78 or 0.68 
instead of 0.88 or that surrogate accuracy were at one of the lower 
two levels.  Reliability numbers in fact go as low as 0.76125 and the 
68% surrogate accuracy figure is based on the largest sample.  Using 
these values instead would put the base rate incapacity cut-off at 36%.  
Perhaps it is not unreasonable to suppose that the cut-off base rate for 
testing (at least for nondementia patients) should be somewhere 
between 9% and 36%.126  Having laid the groundwork for deciding 
when to assess capacity, this Article will now consider the various 
criteria one might use as triggers for testing. 
2.  Treatment 
Existing data provide some support for Illinois’s requirement of 
capacity testing before administering ECT.  One study found 26% of 
ECT patients as incompetent or probably incompetent to consent to 
ECT.127  The data more strongly support testing before voluntary 
admission.  In one study, “half of the newly [voluntarily] admitted 
patients did not think they needed hospitalization for treatment.”128  
In another, only one patient out of forty was able to recall in a 
subsequent interview any part of the voluntary-admission form he or 
 
124 Dilip V. Jeste et al., Magnitude of Impairment in Decisional Capacity in People with 
Schizophrenia Compared to Normal Subjects: An Overview, 32 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 
121, 126 (2005). 
125 Marson et al., supra note 111, at 911. 
126 As explained above, this range assumes that sensitivity equals specificity.  Taking a 
sensitivity rate in the mid-range of reliability estimates, 0.83, and the middle figure, 68%, 
gives an estimate of the effect of allowing specificity to vary.  At a 10% false positive rate, 
the base rate incapacity threshold for testing is 18%.  At 17% (1 – x), the threshold is 27%.  
And at 24%, the cut-off is 34%. 
127 Loren H. Roth et al., Competency to Decide About Treatment or Research: An 
Overview of Some Empirical Data, 5 INT’L J.L. PSYCHIATRY 29, 40 (1982) (finding “[s]ix 
of 23 ECT patients” to be “either incompetent or probably incompetent”). 
128 Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Empirical Assessment of Competency to Consent to 
Psychiatric Hospitalization, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1170, 1174 (1981). 
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she had signed.129  Half of the interviews took place as early as 
between one and three days after admission.130  A third study found 
that 30% of voluntarily admitted patients lacked capacity to consent 
to admission.131 
The case for across-the-board testing before administering 
psychotropic medication is less compelling.  Among newly admitted 
psychiatric inpatients, the base rate of incapacity to consent to 
antipsychotic medication (46%) appears to be well above the 
threshold that would justify across-the-board testing.132  The same is 
true for elderly hospital inpatients (50% incapacity).133  It is doubtful 
that such high rates of incapacity exist among outpatients.  The 
relatively low rates reported below for psychiatric outpatients are 
suggestive.  Second-generation antipsychotic medications are 
prescribed not only to address acute psychosis, but also to maintain 
relatively normal functioning among schizophrenic and bipolar 
individuals. Furthermore, psychotropic medication under Illinois 
statute includes not only antipsychotics but also antidepressants.  
Many millions of Americans take antidepressants,134 and data suggest 
that very few depressed outpatients lack decision-making capacity.135 
 
129 Albert B. Palmer & Julian Wohl, Voluntary-Admission Forms: Does the Patient 
Know What He’s Signing?, 23 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 250, 252 (1972). 
130 Id. at 251. 
131 See Michael A. Norko et al., A Clinical Study of Competency to Consent to 
Voluntary Psychiatric Hospitalization, 11 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 3, 11 (1990).  A 
fourth study found that 44% of voluntarily admitted patients were incompetent to consent 
to treatment within the hospital.  B.F. Hoffman & J. Srinivasan, A Study of Competence to 
Consent to Treatment in a Psychiatric Hospital, 37 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 179, 181 (1992). 
132 See James C. Beck, Determining Competency to Assent to Neuroleptic Drug 
Treatment, 39 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1106, 1107 (1988) (finding that in a 
sample of fifty-six hospital patients admitted consecutively to psychiatric unit, all agreed 
to take antipsychotic medication but 46% remained incompetent to consent throughout the 
forty-eight-hour period from the initial interview, even after receiving a prepared 
explanation). 
133 See Gurian et al., supra note 11, at 39 (50% of patients taking neuroleptics in 
hospital had “neither insight into their disorder nor the capacity to fully comprehend the 
risks and benefits of medication”). 
134 Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics, “Almost Half of Americans Use at Least One 
Prescription Drug: Annual Report on Nation’s Health Shows,” at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/04news/hus04.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2009) (“Adult 
use of antidepressants almost tripled between 1988-1994 and 1999-2000.  Ten percent of 
women 18 and older and 4 percent of men now take antidepressants.”). 
135 See Sturman, supra note 109, at 970 (summarizing study finding no incapacity 
among outpatients with depression and 24%–25% incapacity among inpatients). 
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3.  Status 
This discussion of psychotropic medication suggests that, when 
considering incapacity rates, it may be important to distinguish among 
treatment settings such as a hospital, an ICU, a nursing home, or an 
outpatient facility, for example.  Among schizophrenics, the 
incapacity rate varies from as high as 52% for inpatients136 to 10% 
for outpatients.137  Hospitalized elderly patients with medical 
problems have lower capacity (28% incapacity) than comparable 
individuals in the community (4% incapacity).138  Nursing-home 
residents do very poorly on capacity tests.139  One study “reported 
that the majority of nursing home residents had intermediate to 
profound impairments in capacity.”140  Another study found that 34% 
to 38% of newly admitted ICU patients lacked capacity.141  A review 
summarized decisional impairment among ICU patients ranging from 
44% to 69%.142 
4.  Diagnosis 
The two diagnostic groups most widely tested for capacity are 
individuals with schizophrenia and dementia.  As noted above, 
estimated incapacity rates among schizophrenics range from 52% for 
inpatients to 10% for outpatients.143  Rates of incapacity among 
patients with dementia is quite high, with severity of illness playing 
an important role.  One study employing several standardized 
 
136 Grisso & Appelbaum, supra note 10, at 171. 
137 J.G. Wong et al., The Capacity of People with a “Mental Disability” to Make a 
Health Care Decision, 30 PSYCHOL. MED. 295, 302 tbl.2 (2000) (finding 90% of patients 
to have capacity).  This 10% figure was not significantly higher than the 0% rate observed 
in a control group.  Id. at 295. 
138 L. Jaime Fitten & Martha S. Waite, Impact of Medical Hospitalization on Treatment 
Decision-Making Capacity in the Elderly, 150 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1717, 1719 
tbl. 2 (1990) (finding 28% incapacity among age 60+ inpatients with acute but not critical 
illness and 4% among control group). 
139 L. Jaime Fitten et al., Assessing Treatment Decision-Making Capacity in Elderly 
Nursing Home Residents, 38 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 1097, 1097 (1990) (“Of 51 
Veterans Affairs nursing home residents . . . , only 33.3% demonstrated intact decision-
making capacity . . . .”). 
140 Sturman, supra note 109, at 968. 
141 Cohen et al., supra note 111, at 2483 (finding that nurses and physicians would 
request informed consent from 66% and 62% of patients, respectively, indicating that 34% 
to 38% lacked capacity to consent). 
142 Kim et al., supra note 59, at 159. 
143 See supra notes 136–37. 
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instruments found 9%–23% of adults with mild dementia to be 
impaired in understanding.144 Another study reported that on the most 
demanding legal standing (understanding choice), 93% of those with 
mild Alzheimer’s disease (AD) (MMSE > 19) and 100% of those 
with moderate AD (10 ≤ MMSE < 20) were incompetent.145  A low-
risk research study applying a very low threshold of capacity 
excluded 76% of severely demented subjects.146  One reviewer 
concluded that “persons with MMSE scores in the mild to early 
moderate stage of dementia (MMSE 19 to 23) warrant a detailed 
assessment of their decision-making abilities.”147 
5.  Symptom 
Symptoms may be more important than diagnosis.  Among 
individuals suffering from acute psychosis — schizophrenia, 
schizoaffective disorder, or bipolar mood disorder— d iagnosis has 
been found not to correlate with capacity: “the presence of cognitively 
related symptoms [e.g., delusions, grandiosity, and unusual thought], 
such as thought disorder rather than diagnosis, may better identify the 
subgroup of patients who require particular support with consent 
procedures.”148  Other symptoms that have been shown to be 
negatively correlated with capacity include: (1) lack of judgment and 
insight, difficulty in abstract thinking, conceptual disorganization, and 
cognitive deficits;149 and (2) cognitive dysfunction, avolition, apathy, 
anhedonia, inappropriate affect, and hallucinations.150 
One study concludes that, 
 
144 Moye et al., supra note 112, at 1062. 
145 Daniel C. Marson et al., Assessing the Competency of Patients with Alzheimer’s 
Disease Under Different Legal Standards: A Prototype Instrument, 52 ARCH. NEUROL. 
949, 952 tbl.3 (1995). 
146 B. Geiselmann, Demented Subjects’ Competence to Consent to Participate in Field 
Studies: The Berlin Ageing Study, 13 MED. & L. 177, 182 (1994). 
147 J.H.T. Karlawish et al., The Ability of Persons with Alzheimer Disease (AD) to Make 
a Decision About Taking an AD Treatment, 64 NEUROLOGY 1514, 1518 (2005). 
148 V. Howe et al., Competence to Give Informed Consent in Acute Psychosis Is 
Associated with Symptoms Rather than Diagnosis, 77 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 211, 214 
(2005). 
149 See Josephine G.W.S. Wong et al., Decision-Making Capacity of Inpatients with 
Schizophrenia in Hong Kong, 193 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 316 (2005); Grisso & 
Appelbaum, supra note 10, at 169. 
150 David J. Moser et al., Capacity to Provide Informed Consent for Participation in 
Schizophrenia and HIV Research, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1201, 1204–06 (2002); Grisso 
& Appelbaum, supra note 10, at 173. 
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[a] more effective approach [to assessing capacity among 
psychiatric patients] than focusing on diagnosis is to be attentive to 
cognitive deficits and negative symptoms.  Use of brief screening 
questionnaires may also be an efficient means of identifying who 
would benefit from more extensive capacity evaluations and/or 
enhanced consent procedures.151 
Screening is discussed below. 
Delirium is another symptom that would appear to justify capacity 
testing.  In one earlier mentioned study of older inpatients with 
delirium, researchers found a “relatively high baseline rate of 
functional impairment (76%) . . . and notable cognitive impairment 
(mean MMSE of 20.1).”152 
6.  Decision 
As noted above in the sliding-scale discussion, it has been observed 
that “patients who refuse treatment tend to have less capacity than 
those who accept it.”153  Depending on the levels of incapacity 
observed among refusers and acceptors of treatment, this difference 
might justify capacity testing of treatment refusers only.  More 
research is needed.  Note that such an asymmetric sliding screen 
could be justified by straightforward application of the general 
formula set forth above, without any balancing between autonomy 
and beneficence or any thumb on the treatment side of the scale. 
7.  Screening 
The costs of capacity testing could be reduced substantially with 
reasonably accurate screening mechanisms.  One recent study is 
instructive.154  The study assessed the capacity to consent to 
participate in a research project of almost even numbers of subjects 
with schizophrenia, mild to moderate AD, and diabetes.  Researchers 
administered both the MacCAT-CR (the research version of the 
MacCAT-T) and a three-item questionnaire to all 101 subjects.  The 
 
151 Barton W. Palmer & Dilip V. Jeste, Relationship of Individual Cognitive Abilities to 
Specific Components of Decisional Capacity Among Middle-Aged and Older Patients with 
Schizophrenia, 32 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 98, 105 (2005) (citation omitted). 
152 Auerswald, supra note 12, at 413. 
153 Francine Cournos, Do Psychiatric Patients Need Greater Protection than Medical 
Patients When They Consent to Treatment?, 64 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 319, 327 (1993). 
154 Barton W. Palmer et al., Assessment of Capacity to Consent to Research Among 
Older Persons with Schizophrenia, Alzheimer Disease, or Diabetes Mellitus, 62 ARCHIVES 
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 726 (2005). 
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three questions were: “(1) ‘What is the purpose of the study?’ (2) 
‘What are the risks?’ and (3) ‘What are the benefits?’”155 (These 
questions could easily be transposed to the treatment context.)  “All 
13 of the patients impaired on the MacCAT-CR understanding 
subscale had 3-item questionnaire total scores of 2.5 or less, and 
specificity (1 – false positives) at this cut score was 77.3%.”156  In 
other words, 36% of those who failed the three-item test were deemed 
incapacitated.  Note that this base rate justifies capacity testing, even 
given relatively anti-testing assumptions.  Screening tests have the 
potential to identify with little cost a subset of individuals from a 
relatively low-risk population (13% in the study) who are at a high 
enough risk of incapacity (36%) to justify thorough testing.157  In 
other words, a 13% incapacity base rate could be taken as the 
threshold for mandatory capacity screening. 
8.  Implications 
Even on assumptions that disfavor testing, the goal of minimizing 
deviations from true treatment preferences would justify full-capacity 
testing in groups with base-rate incapacity at or above 36% and 
capacity screening in groups with base rates at or above 13%.  With 
the exceptions of normal control groups, outpatient schizophrenics, 
outpatients on antidepressants, and perhaps the mildly demented, 
testing or screening would seem justified for most of the groups (by 
treatment, diagnosis, symptom, etc.) discussed above.  One could 
simply mandate capacity testing or screening before treatment for 
anyone in one of these groups.  There are several reasons, however, to 
pause before doing so. 
First, testing and screening take time.  The three-item questionnaire 
described above would seem relatively quick, but to be meaningful it 
must be followed by full-capacity testing in the third or more of 
subjects who fail.  As many as two-thirds of those tested, or one-
quarter of the total screened, will have capacity.  To be sure, the 
screening questionnaire could eliminate the need for testing in as 
many as two-thirds of the population, but the costs of follow-up 
testing would still be substantial.  The opportunity costs of doctor and 
 
155 Id. at 728. 
156 Id. at 731. 
157 Note that this threshold for screening is substantially below the level suggested by 
some commentators.  See Saks & Jeste, supra note 7, at 411, 426 (“[E]ven if only most 
mentally ill people were incompetent, it might make sense at least to inquire —do some 
kind of screening— o f people with serious mental illness   . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
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patient time are difficult to estimate and perhaps infeasible to trade 
off against erroneous treatment decisions.  However, quite substantial 
costs of screening and testing would be justified in order to bring 
treatment decisions more in line with patients’ true preferences.  
Treatment without bona fide consent is illegitimate and should be 
avoided even at high cost. 
Second, different treatment decisions require different levels of 
capacity.  A moderately demented man may understand the situation 
well enough to consent to take aspirin for a headache, but might be 
completely stymied by more complicated treatment.  The numbers 
reported above are specific to particular treatment decisions, and these 
decisions may not be typical or representative of those faced by actual 
patients.  This problem may be mitigated to some extent where 
multiple studies addressing different treatment decisions reveal 
comparable estimates of base-rate incapacity.  And while screening 
and testing for simple decisions may not be error-rate justified in 
every case, at least it will take less time than for more complex 
decisions. 
Third, differential capacity assessment by diagnosis is arguably 
discriminatory.  However, the existence of data showing the 
discriminatory practice advances the goal of bringing treatment into 
line with true patient preferences should overcome due process, equal 
protection, and Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) 
challenges.158  The disparate impact of the practice would seem 
similarly justifiable.159 
9.  Proposal 
Documented capacity screening — and, if warranted by screening, 
full testing— s hould be required before medical treatment whenever 
there is good reason to believe that the patient may lack capacity to 
consent to treatment.160  A statute adopting this proposal could 
 
158 The ADA prohibits: “Providing . . . different . . . services to people with disabilities, 
unless . . . different benefits are necessary to provide qualified individuals . . . services that 
are as effective as those provided to others.”  ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. 
RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 167 (1996) (emphasis 
added). 
159 RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL ASPECTS 1132 (3d ed. 1999) (ADA prohibits disparate impact). 
160 Others have made similar recommendations.  See Edward Etchells et al., Bioethics 
for Clinicians: 3. Capacity, 155 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 657, 658 (1996) (“If it is 
unreasonable to presume capacity, then a capacity assessment should be undertaken.”). 
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provide a nonexhaustive list of “good reasons” based on existing 
data.161  On the list would be: (1) the patient is seeking voluntary 
admission to a psychiatric unit or facility;162 (2) the patient is in an 
inpatient facility and the treatment is psychotropic medication;163 (3) 
the treatment is ECT; (4) the patient is in the ICU; (5) the patient is in 
a nursing home; (6) the patient is suffering from acute psychosis, 
cognitive deficits, negative symptoms (listed above), or delirium;164 
and (7) the patient has an MMSE score less than twenty-four.  Note 
that to minimize discrimination, the proposed statute omits any 
reference to diagnosis.  In any tort or civil rights action based on 
unauthorized treatment, no treating physician, other health 
professional, or facility could rely on the presumption of capacity if 
the physician, professional, or any employee of the facility knew or 
should have known there was good reason to believe that the patient 
may have lacked capacity to consent to treatment and the physician, 
professional, or employee did not screen or test for capacity. 
This last provision should hopefully go some distance in solving 
the problem that mandatory capacity-assessment statutes are basically 
ignored.  Other more direct enforcement mechanisms are possible.  
The failure to screen or test where required could give rise to a private 
cause of action for a set statutory amount.  However, the amount 
reasonably at issue seems unlikely to justify many lawsuits.  
Administrative procedures may make more sense.  The state health 
authority (or Joint Commission on hospital accreditation) could 
perform periodic unannounced inspections of medical records and 
fine health-care providers for failing to document capacity testing 
where required.165  As others have suggested for informed consent 
 
161 Better data could support a statute or practice guidelines that would simultaneously 
account for different variables.  Such statistical prediction models have proven very useful 
in other contexts.  See generally IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS: WHY 
THINKING-BY-NUMBERS IS THE NEW WAY TO BE SMART (2007). 
162 I am not the first to make the recommendation.  See Cournos et al., supra note 52, at 
299.  The task force, however, would have set a much lower capacity threshold. 
163 One researcher has gone further in this context, proposing that there should be a 
presumption of incompetence.  Gurian et al., supra note 11, at 43. 
164 Here, the supporting evidence is correlational within diagnosis rather than measuring 
absolute levels by symptom across diagnoses.  Additional research is needed.  See Laura 
B. Dunn, Capacity to Consent to Research in Schizophrenia: The Expanding Evidence 
Base, 24 BEHAV. SCI. L. 431, 434 (2006). 
165 Failures to attempt to consult with surrogates where capacity is lacking should be 
penalized in the same way.  See C. Dennis Barton, Jr., et al., Clinicians’ Judgment of 
Capacity of Nursing Home Patients to Give Informed Consent, 47 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 
956, 956 (1996) (“None of the [13] subjects whom clinical staff identified as clinically 
 390 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87, 353 
generally, funds raised through fines could be used to compensate 
individuals who were harmed by failures to assess capacity.166 
10.  Counter-Arguments and Responses 
Bruce Winick has argued that capacity testing should not be 
required before an individual voluntarily admits himself to a mental 
hospital.167  Winick provides five arguments, which could apply to 
mandatory capacity screening and testing outside the voluntary-
admission context: (1) “requiring such an inquiry for all mental 
patients seeking hospital admission . . . seems to accept the 19th-
century assumption that mental illness per se destroys decision-
making capacity”;168 (2) once one starts questioning capacity, there is 
no logical stopping point and this “would necessitate an inquiry into 
the issue of competence every time an individual with mental illness 
seeks to exercise a right”;169 (3) incompetency labeling “imposes 
serious adverse social consequences and psychological damage”;170 
(4) because competency “often is a close question,” the presumption 
of competence prevents “excessive paternalism”;171 and, finally, (5) 
better adherence to the presumption of competence will “produce 
competency adjudications that are considerably more accurate and 
more protective of individual autonomy than under present 
practices.”172  None of these arguments should prevail. 
First, as demonstrated above, combining certain plausible 
assumptions with actual incapacity data shows that across-the-board 
screening and testing of individuals seeking voluntary admission can 
be expected to reduce instances in which decisions deviate from the 
individuals’ true preferences.  That all such individuals lack capacity 
was not one of the premises for this showing.  Rather, the showing 
 
incompetent was provided with surrogate decision makers in accordance with procedures 
outlined in state law.”). 
166 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 61, 152 n.3 (quoting Leonard L. 
Riskin, Informed Consent: Looking for the Action, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 580, 606–07 (1975)). 
167 See Bruce J. Winick, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study: Legal and 
Therapeutic Implications, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 137 (1996) [hereinafter Winick, 
MacArthur]. 
168 Id. at 154. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. (citing, inter alia, Bruce J. Winick, The Side Effects of Incompetency Labeling 
and the Implications for Mental Health Law, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 6 (1995) 
[hereinafter Winick, Side Effects]). 
171 Winick, MacArthur, supra note 167, at 156–57. 
172 Id. at 158. 
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was based on several estimates of actual incapacity and surrogate 
accuracy.  But one need not look at the numbers to see the flaw in 
Winick’s position — indeed, he concedes it by using the wiggle words 
“seems to accept.”  There would be no need for any inquiry into 
decision-making capacity if one truly accepted the nineteenth-century 
assumption that the mentally ill uniformly lack capacity.  Requiring 
an inquiry assumes just the opposite: that some mentally ill 
individuals have capacity. 
The second argument, a parade of horribles, is also a nonstarter.173  
Requiring capacity testing before medical treatment says nothing 
about other contexts.  Indeed, there are very good reasons to treat 
medical care differently.  Medical care without competent consent is 
battery, which carries civil and possible criminal sanctions.  Entering 
into a contract or making a will without capacity may raise other 
issues, but certainly does not constitute a tort or crime as serious as 
battery.  Doctors are trained to test capacity, or at least to understand 
the basics of informed consent, and are available testers every time 
medical care takes place.  No comparable expert is already on the 
scene in other contexts. 
Third, Winick is no doubt correct that being labeled incompetent 
has adverse consequences.  But forgoing capacity testing on this 
ground is a bit like taking your malfunctioning car to a mechanic and, 
for fear of bad news, telling the mechanic not to look under the hood.  
Being labeled incompetent is bad; being incompetent is worse.  To be 
incompetent is to lose control over the most basic aspects of your life.  
Adding a label does not change that.174  Relatives do better than 
doctors in figuring out what incapacitated patients would want.  In 
order to shift decision-making responsibility, however, there must be 
a determination that the patient lacks capacity and that such a 
determination may carry negative consequences.  Using the narrower 
term “incapacitated” rather than the more pejorative “incompetent” 
may go some distance toward reducing stigma,175 but ultimately the 
question is whether patients would prefer more accurate decision 
making by family even though the cost may be an incapacity label. 
The benefits of more accurate decisions made by family members 
outweigh the harms of incapacity labeling.  One of Winick’s 
 
173 That has not stopped others from ascribing to it.  See Cournos et al., supra note 52, 
at 297. 
174 Cf. Winick, Side Effects, supra note 170, at 13 (“Application of an incompetency 
label usually produces an actual and obvious loss of control.”). 
175 Id. at 40. 
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objections to incompetency labeling is that “surrogate decision 
makers will likely be impersonal state officials or employees whose 
paternalism is not based on love and is rarely nurturing.”176  But this 
is not so when, as under my proposal, the surrogate is a patient-
appointed proxy, court-appointed guardian, or, more likely, statutorily 
appointed close relative. Indeed, it is the status quo— u nconstrained 
decision making by the treating physician — that will often place a 
stranger at the wheel.177 
Winick’s fourth and fifth arguments are directed toward the 
presumption of competence, not testing per se, but they could be read 
broadly as attacks on mandatory testing.  On the fourth point, 
competency may not be so often a “close question.”178  The observed 
high inter-rater reliability of standardized capacity-assessment 
instruments suggests that judgment calls are rather infrequent; 
capacity testers tend to agree.179  In any event, a mandatory-testing 
regime can leave room for the presumption of capacity in close cases.  
This Article proposes that the presumption be suspended only when 
no screening or testing took place.  Ultimately, whether “paternalism” 
is “excessive,” or whether a tie-breaker presumption of capacity 
increases or reduces accuracy, depends on where one sets the capacity 
bar.  Apart from discussion of the sliding scale, this Article does not 
address that question. 
Winick’s final argument is that presuming competency protects 
individual autonomy.  As long as the capacity bar is set at the right 
level, the presumption protects only the illusion of autonomy by 
ascribing capacity to some who lack it.  A truly incapacitated patient 
has no genuine autonomy.  That such a patient agrees to treatment is a 
happy accident, not an expression of will. 
 
176 Id. at 14; see also id. at 30 (“[P]aternalism on the basis of parental love and a 
knowledge of the child’s interest rooted in actual familiarity is much more likely to be 
beneficial than that engaged in by impersonal state actors who lack an ongoing 
relationship with the individual.”). 
177 Winick also observes that the negative consequences of incompetency labeling are 
increased when there is a formal hearing and “official finding of incompetency by a 
judicial or administrative decision maker.”  Id. at 28.  Thus, a clinical finding by a health-
care professional, as contemplated here, has fewer negative effects. 
178 Winick, MacArthur, supra note 167, at 157. 
179 See Raymont et al., supra note 123, at 114. 
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D.  Application and Implementation of the Model 
Recall again the three hypotheticals set forth at the outset: (1) a 
married woman with delirium, (2) a widow with dementia and 
evening delusions, and (3) an unmarried bipolar man in a manic state.  
In light of the patients’ symptoms and the proposed treatment, the 
first step in each case, assuming no emergency, would be capacity 
screening followed by full testing if necessary.  Any patient who had 
capacity should of course be allowed to make his or her own 
treatment decision.  If any patient lacks capacity, the next step would 
be to look for an advance directive, health-care proxy, or court-
appointed guardian.  Assuming none exists, the health-care decision 
would be made by a statutory surrogate, if available, which would be 
the husband in the first hypothetical, the only adult child in the second 
hypothetical, and, most likely, the man’s parents in the third 
hypothetical.  A patient could insist on a second opinion regarding 
capacity if the surrogate refuses treatment.  The surrogate’s decision 
for treatment or non-treatment otherwise would be final unless the 
doctor obtains a court order overruling the decision as clearly 
inconsistent with the patient’s expressed preferences or best interests.  
If the parents in the third hypothetical consented to voluntary 
admission, the bipolar man would have a right to a second opinion 
within twenty-four hours of such a request. 
To make the proposal concrete in one state, Illinois would need to 
enact the following six changes.  First, a new section to the Act 
should mandate capacity screening and testing where there is good 
reason to doubt capacity, including a nonexhaustive list of good 
reasons.  Second, the Act should state that screening and testing are to 
be done by standardized instruments wherever feasible and expressly 
prohibit application of the asymmetric sliding scale.  Third, the Act 
should be amended to state that an incapacitated patient’s assent to 
treatment when the surrogate refuses treatment does not qualify as an 
“objection” so as to nullify applicability of the Act, but that the 
patient can request a second opinion as to capacity.  Fourth, a section 
providing for judicial override of surrogate decisions on the treating 
physician’s petition should be added to the Act.  Fifth, the mental-
health exceptions to the Act and related limitations in the Code should 
be repealed insofar as they include instances of patient assent.  
Finally, a twenty-four hour second-opinion option should be added to 
the voluntary-admission section of the Code. 
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IV 
EXTENSIONS 
A.  When There Is No Surrogate 
This Article has assumed that a statutory surrogate will be 
available to make decisions when the patient is incapacitated.  Of 
course, this assumption will sometimes be false.  A patient may have 
no willing and available surrogate.  One solution in such a case is to 
revert to effectively unconstrained physician decision making.  That 
solution has been suggested by at least one commentator.180  The 
justification to prefer surrogate decision making set forth in this 
Article is that surrogates predict patient preferences more accurately 
than doctors.  When there is no surrogate, there is no readily available 
decision maker with proven increased accuracy.  The treating 
physician is at least available. 
There are, however, other reasons to resist unrestrained physician 
control.  Medical treatment without meaningful consent is battery.181  
It is not meaningful for a doctor to “consent” to her own treatment 
decisions.  Where else can we turn for consent?  The existing 
statutory fall-back option is guardianship.  But guardianship is a time-
consuming process, and it may be infeasible to appoint a guardian 
before treating every incapacitated patient, especially when the patient 
is assenting to treatment.  This problem is exacerbated in the 
outpatient setting, where much treatment of dementia takes place.  It 
may make sense to create a more expedited process to obtain interim 
consent while the guardianship process is pursued.  An ethics review 
board or, probably better, an independent patient-advocate could be 
made available for consultation and provisional decision making. 
 
180 See Cournos, supra note 153, at 326 (“When a patient accepts treatment, the 
agreement of the treating physician, and, when available, the family, constitutes a check 
on the reasonableness of the patient’s decision.”) (emphasis added). 
181 Some states have carved out exceptions.  See Grant H. Morris, Judging Judgment: 
Assessing the Competence of Mental Patients to Refuse Treatment, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
343, 380 (1995) (Under California statute, “[n]onprotesting [involuntarily committed 
mental] patients may be treated with psychotropic medication without giving a competent 
consent.”). 
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B.  When the Patient Refuses Treatment 
Approximately ten percent of psychiatric patients refuse 
treatment.182  When the patient is incapacitated, there is some surface 
appeal in treating assent and refusal the same.  What does it matter 
what the patient says if the patient lacks capacity?  The implication of 
accepting this position, in light of this Article’s thesis with respect to 
assent, would be to shift decision-making authority to a surrogate.  
The surrogate would have authority to overrule treatment refusal in 
the same way the surrogate would have authority to overrule 
treatment assent.  That position should be rejected.  Treatment assent 
and refusal are not parallel in important respects. 
Patients have a general right to refuse treatment,183 but have a right 
to treatment only in limited circumstances (e.g., when the state is 
custodian).184  Overruling treatment refusal more directly implicates 
privacy and due process interests and may therefore require a more 
formal adjudication of capacity and appropriateness of treatment.  
Overriding a refusal also requires deception, coercion, or force.  It 
makes sense to more carefully constrain exercise of such disfavored 
methods.185  And, finally, treatment over refusal is often less effective 
than treatment with assent.186  One might expect doctors and 
surrogates to appreciate and factor in this last point, but the other two 
distinct aspects of overriding refusal— p atient rights and coercive 
methods — require special protection. 
One alternative would be to combine the second-opinion and 
independent-patient-advocate proposals outlined at different points 
above.  Specifically, physicians and surrogates seeking to override 
patient refusal would need to obtain a second medical opinion finding 
both incapacity and treatment appropriateness, as well as consent 
 
182 Paul S. Appelbaum, The Right to Refuse Treatment with Antipsychotic Medications:  
Retrospect and Prospect, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 413, 418 (1988). 
183 See Rebecca J. O’Neill, Surrogate Health Care Decisions for Adults in Illinois —
Answers to the Legal Questions that Health Care Providers Face on a Daily Basis, 29 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 411, 460–61 (1998) (“As the Illinois Appellate Court stated, ‘[t]he right 
to refuse medical treatment has been recognized under constitutional right-to-privacy 
principles and is deeply ingrained in common law principles of individual autonomy, self-
determination, and informed consent.’”) (alteration original) (citing Ficke v. Evangelical 
Health Sys., 674 N.E.2d 888, 889 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/3(a) 
(2008); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/5 (2008). 
184 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, LAW AND MENTAL DISABILITY, §§ 2.02-2.07 (1994). 
185 On the clinical costs of coercion, see APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 86, at 
204. 
186 Winick, Competency to Consent, supra note 1, at 198, 213. 
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from an independent patient advocate who would discuss the issues 
with the physician, surrogate, and, to the extent possible, the patient.  
Repeating capacity testing can substantially increase confidence in an 
incapacity finding,187 and the additional pro-treatment assessments by 
a second medical professional and a patient advocate would provide 
some assurance that treatment is appropriate.  As with patient assent, 
surrogates would have the power, subject to court overrule, to veto 
treatment.  The following table summarizes the tentative proposal: 
 
TABLE: SUMMARY OF OUTCOMES BY ASSENT/CONSENT 
TO TREATMENT 
  
Surrogate Consent 
 
Surrogate Refusal 
Patient 
Assent 
Treatment No treatment, subject to 
second opinion at request of 
patient or judicial override 
at request of doctor 
Patient 
Refusal 
Treatment, if second opinion 
confirms incapacity and 
treatment appropriateness and 
independent patient advocate 
consents 
No treatment, subject to 
judicial override at request 
of doctor 
This proposal can be criticized as both over- and under-protective 
of patient rights.  Requiring a second opinion would often be 
cumbersome in the outpatient setting.  On the other hand, providing 
less than notice and a hearing arguably falls short of constitutional 
requirements.  Whether the more informal process proposed here is 
constitutional is outside the scope of this Article.  It is important to 
note, however, that a more formal process does not necessarily 
translate into greater protection of patient interests.  Doctors will 
develop strategies to avoid costly and time-consuming court hearings.  
These strategies may include: (1) discharging, failing to admit, or 
otherwise not treating patients who refuse treatment; (2) selectively 
disclosing information to ensure assent; (3) coercing “voluntary” 
treatment; (4) and treating nonemergency situations as emergencies to 
 
187 At 76% test accuracy with a 24% false positive rate and 36% incapacity base rate, a 
single positive incapacity test is 64% likely to show true incapacity.  Testing twice 
increases confidence to 85%. 
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avoid the consent requirement.188  Less costly procedures, like repeat 
capacity testing, may hold more potential in promoting patient 
autonomy and well-being. 
 
CONCLUSION 
An incapacitated patient cannot meaningfully consent to medical 
care.  And yet, current legal rules and the beneficence imperative of 
doctoring provide strong incentives to take such illusory consent at 
face value.  Two such legal rules are the presumption of capacity and, 
in the mental-health setting, the requirement for court proceedings.  
The beneficence principle means that doctors generally place patient 
well-being above other values, including self-determination.  
Together, these incentives in fact dominate actual practice.  Doctors 
tend to question capacity only when the patient refuses treatment.  If 
the patient assents to treatment, it is often given with no inquiry into 
patient capacity.  This practice of respecting illusory consent 
superficially advances the goal of patient autonomy.  “The patient 
said yes, so we’re just respecting that decision.”  A subtler version of 
this argument is that even an incapacitated individual has some 
residual autonomy, so, at least when the patient is making a good 
decision, we should respect that autonomy.189  But autonomy means 
respecting bad decisions as well as good ones.  The best way to 
advance the goal of self-determination is to make the treatment 
decisions that the patient would have made if the patient had capacity.  
The question should be which decision maker will best accomplish 
this end. 
The patient, by definition, is incapacitated, which leaves, in most 
cases and short of going to court, the doctor and the family as 
decision makers.  The current system in Illinois and many other states 
effectively assigns treatment decisions, if the patient assents, to 
doctors.  Relatives do better than both chance and doctors in 
predicting patient preferences.  Because the patient’s wishes should 
remain the gold standard even if the patient loses the ability to make 
decisions for himself, relatives rather than doctors should be in 
charge.  Consulting relatives is obviously much less burdensome than 
going to court, but experience outside the mental-health context 
 
188 E.g., Morris, supra note 181, at 385–86; Delila M.J. Ledwith, Jones v. Gerhardstein: 
The Involuntarily Committed Mental Patient’s Right to Refuse Treatment with 
Psychotropic Drugs, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1367, 1391 (1990). 
189 Winick, Competency to Consent, supra note 1, at 192–93. 
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demonstrates that reducing this cost of capacity testing may not be 
sufficient to induce doctors to assess capacity more routinely. 
If the goal is to minimize deviations from actual patient 
preferences, and costs of testing are set aside, three variables 
determine whether capacity testing should take place: (1) the accuracy 
of the test, (2) the base rate of incapacity in the population tested, and 
(3) the accuracy of surrogates.  There are substantial data on each of 
these three variables, which together suggest several types of patients 
and treatment decisions where capacity assessment should be 
mandatory.  These mandates could be enforced through a system of 
administrative monitoring and penalties. 
Respect for individual autonomy sometimes requires overriding 
what the individual says.  This may be true when a patient lacks 
decision-making capacity, even if the patient agrees to beneficial 
treatment.  The same patient might not have agreed to treatment if he 
had capacity to give informed consent. Doctors in this situation will 
be very unlikely to allow the goal of patient well-being to be trumped 
by the goal of patient self-determination.  Family may also be 
imperfect, but the data suggest that they will do better at honoring a 
patient’s true treatment preferences.  The goal of self-determination 
sometimes requires that capacity be tested and, where incapacity is 
found, decisions delegated to family. 
 
 
